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Abstract 
After the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008, financial panic and 
uncertainty intensified in Europe. In France, banks faced a widespread confidence crisis 
driven by fear that they were exposed to the US subprime market. In response, on October 
13, 2008, the French government passed the “loi de finances rectificative pour le 
financement de I'économie.” This provided for the establishment of the Société de 
Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF), a special purpose vehicle (SPV) jointly owned 
by the State and a group of banks and responsible for refinancing major French credit 
institutions. The SFEF raised funds on the international market and used the proceeds to 
provide collateralized loans to major credit institutions. SFEF debt was guaranteed by the 
French government. The SFEF was active from October 2008 to September 2009 and 
provided approximately €77 billion in funding to a group of institutions that included the 
vast majority of the major French banks. In September 2009, the Caisse de Refinancement 
de l’Habitat, a French credit institution specifically focused on housing finance, took over the 
SFEF’s outstanding debt management.  
Keywords: Société de Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF), State Guarantee
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
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At a Glance  
The collapse of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15, 2008, sparked an 
international financial panic. French banks 
experienced significant drops in earnings 
and rising defaults. The financial system 
was strained by a confidence crisis caused 
by fear that French banks were exposed to 
the US subprime mortgage market. French 
credit institutions stopped lending to one 
another. The result was a severe liquidity 
freeze and a deep recession.    
To inject liquidity into the financial system 
and ensure access to financing for French 
households and businesses on October 17, 
2008, the French government established 
the Société de Financement de l’Economie 
Française (SFEF), a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) responsible for the refinancing of 
major credit institutions. The state owned 
34% of SFEF’s shares, while major credit institutions owned the remaining 66%. The SFEF 
would raise funds by issuing debt instruments on the global market. These securities were 
fully backed by the French state for up to €265 billion. The SFEF would use the funds raised 
on the market to provide loans for eligible institutions. The loans had a maximum maturity 
of five years, as did the securities issued by the SFEF. To participate, credit institutions were 
required to commit to a number of ethical and economic requirements, most significantly, 
pledging to the financing of the real economy. 
By May 2009, the SFEF had raised €49 billion and 13 major credit institutions had benefited 
from SFEF funding. The SFEF raised €77 billion in total by the end of its operation. In 
September 2009, the Caisse de Refinancement de l’Habitat, a credit institution created by the 
French state in 1985 to focus on housing finance, took over the SFEF’s outstanding debt 
management.  
Summary Evaluation 
The SFEF is generally seen as having been successful in both its effort to raise funds from 
investors as well as its goal of injecting liquidity into the economy. The State’s guarantee on 
debt instruments issued by the SFEF made them a popular investment opportunity. 
Furthermore, the credit institutions benefiting from SFEF funding represented the vast 
majority of total loans to the economy and experienced a substantial increase in loans. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To ensure the continued financing of 
households and businesses and inject liquidity into 
the banking system. 
Announcement Date  October 12, 2008 
Operational Date October 17, 2008 
Date of First Guaranteed 
Loan Issuance  
November 12, 2008 
Issuance Window 
Expiration Date 
Closed to new issuances 
December 31, 2009. 
Officially ended October 
9, 2009 
Program Size  €265 billion 
Usage €77 billion 
Outcomes No defaults;  more than 
€1 billion in fees 
Notable Features Guaranteed debt issued 
by SPV 
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French Liquidity Support through the SFEF: France Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$2,664.5 billion in 2007 




GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
 
$41,508 in 2007 





rating (5-year senior 
debt) 
 














Size of banking 
system 
 
$2,672.8 billion in total assets in 2007 




Size of banking 
system as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
100.4% in 2007 




Size of banking 




Data not available. 
 




of banking system 
 
74.2% of total banking assets in 2007 
73.3% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
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in banking system 
6.0% of total banking assets in 2007 
6.0% of total banking assets in 2008 
 
 




ownership of banking 
system 
 
Data not available. 
 
Source: World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database 
 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
Limits to full coverage: 
 
$100,000 in early December 2008  
 
Source: Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de 
Résolution, OECD 
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In 2008, the financial crisis originating in the US subprime lending market severely damaged 
many European banks. Shortly after Lehman Brothers collapsed in September, European 
financial markets were dominated by panic and uncertainty. The French financial system 
was under maximum strain and vulnerable to further damage (IMF 2009). French banks, 
hurt by a general crisis in confidence and widespread fear that European banks might be 
exposed to the US subprime market, saw a significant drop in earnings and rise in defaults. 
Restricted liquidity caused mistrust among credit institutions. Banks stopped lending to one 
another out of fear that they were exposed to the crisis (Detzer 2014). Sources of financing 
became increasingly rare as the flow of funds through the economy ground to a halt. 
Unemployment in France rose steeply as did the government’s budget deficit. The nation 
experienced a deep recession. Despite all these problems, France was not hit as hard by the 
crisis as many other European countries (Conac 2010).  
Program Description 
Against this backdrop, the “loi de finances rectificative pour le financement de I'économie” 
was passed on October 13, 2008, and adopted on October 17, four days later. It established 
the Société de Financement de l’Economie Française (SFEF) for the refinancing of French 
credit institutions, as well as the Société de Prise de Participations de l’Etat (SPPE) for the 
recapitalization of French credit institutions. The SFEF took the form of a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) jointly owned by a group of seven banks representing 80% of the balance sheet 
of the French banking industry.3 The banks took a 66% ownership stake and the French state 
34% ownership. SFEF did not possess a banking license and was thus not subject to such 
regulations as the Basel capital requirements, but it was overseen by the French Banking 
Commission. Although majority owned by French banks, SFEF had a board of directors 
chaired by the French state and over which the government exercised a veto. Additionally, 
the bank shareholders of the SFEF could earn a profit only on its invested capital equivalent 
to the rate of return on a government bond.   
The SFEF raised money by issuing debt instruments on the international market guaranteed 
by the French government. The organization was given a state guarantee for up to €265 
billion. Securities issued by the SFEF had a maximum maturity of five years, and the state 
guarantee only applied to bonds issued before December 31, 2009. The SFEF used the funds 
raised on the market to issue collateralized loans to eligible credit institutions for 
refinancing. Loans made by the SFEF also had a maximum maturity of five years, with a cap 
of 30% of total loans on loans of more than 3 years. The government does not appear to have 
established minimum maturity requirements for eligible loans or securities issued by SFEF. 
 
3 BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Société Générale, Groupe Caisse d’Epargne, Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel, 
Groupe Banque Populaire, and HSBC France. 
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The total amount of refinancing a bank could receive could not exceed 5% of its balance sheet 
total, or €500 million, whichever value was greater. 
To qualify for SFEF funding, a credit institution had to be licensed in France and meet certain 
capital requirements. Funds were to be allocated to eligible institutions based on a formula 
tied to the size of an institution’s balance sheet in France and the amount of French loans it 
had outstanding. Beneficiary credit institutions were required to enter into an agreement 
with the French state laying out a number of economic and ethical obligations. These 
included providing credit to small and medium-size companies and households, and 
following ethical rules on executive compensation and severance arrangements. Credit 
institutions borrowing from the SFEF were also required to deposit the funds they owed in 
special accounts at the Banque de France pledged to the SFEF several days before payments 
were due. This would give the SFEF time to notify the government of a failure to pay in 
advance and thus acquire funds from the guarantee. Through this process, the SFEF ensured 
its debt holders were repaid in a timely manner.   
The SFEF only granted loans collateralized by eligible receivables. Collateral requirements 
were strict enough to provide the SFEF with the benefit of over-collateralization. In the event 
of a default by the beneficiary credit institution, the SFEF was given “a direct right over any 
sums paid with respect to the underlying receivables and the enforcement proceeds of any 
security rights attached to those receivables” (de Kergommeaux et al. 2008). The SFEF 
charged an interest rate on loans that was set to incorporate the refunding of the SFEF plus 
a fee for the state guarantee based on the maturity of the loan and the credit profile of the 
borrower. 
Outcomes 
In October 2008, the SFEF granted a loan of €5 billion to various banks. This loan was 
financed by a loan to SFEF from the Caisse des Depots et Consignations, France’s state-owned 
financial institution. The state had to cover this first SFEF loan, as efforts to issue bonds were 
still underway. The €5 billion was allocated as follows: 25% to Credit Agricole, 15% to BNP 
Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Mutuel, and Caisse d'Epargne, 10% to Banques Populaires, 
and 5% to RCI Banque. 
In November 2008, the SFEF announced its first bond issue at a rate of 3.5% for three years, 
maturing in November 2011. Investor interest was strong with orders exceeding €5 billion 
within the first hour of operation. By November 12, orders totaled €12 billion. The proceeds 
of this issuance were used to provide nine loans for various credit institutions. In December 
2008, the SFEF launched another public issuance, this one totaling €6 billion, again using the 
proceeds to advance loans to credit institutions. The SFEF continued to operate in this 
fashion for the duration of its existence. (Appendix A summarizes its activity up to July 2009.) 
The identities of the credit institutions receiving each round of loans have not been released, 
though the primary recipients of SFEF funding are known to be Banque Populaires, Caisse 
d'Epargne, BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole, Crédit Mutuel, PSA Finance, and 
RCI Banque.   
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In December 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the banking branches of 
French car manufacturers also had access to SFEF funding. The banking arms of Renault and 
PSA Peugeot Citroën each had access to a maximum of €500 million. In February 2009,the 
French government increased the maximum amount of SFEF funding available to the 
banking arms of French car manufacturers.  
In early 2009, total outstanding loans from beneficiary banks of the SFEF had already grown 
by 7.2% in comparison to 2008. This was well over the goal of the refinancing mechanism to 
increase outstanding loans by 3-4%. By May 2009, the SFEF had issued bonds worth a total 
of €49 billion, consisting of private and public issues. By this time, 13 institutions had 
benefited from loans from the SFEF. The impact of the program was broad. with beneficiary 
institutions representing 83.5% of total loans to the economy at the time. Also at this time, 
the French state requested and was granted a six-month extension of the refinancing plan 
from the European Commission.  
At the end of its operations, the SFEF had issued a total of about €77 billion in debt 
denominated in euros, US dollars, Swiss francs and pounds sterling, with maturities ranging 
from 15 months to 5 years. The SFEF attracted a wide variety of investors, receiving funds 
from some 900 different sources. SFEF bonds carried triple-A ratings and the SFEF became 
one of the most sought-after issuers on the global market (GlobalCapital 2009). In September 
2009, the board of directors decided to stop the SFEF’s operations due to the market 
improvement, and the Caisse de Refinancement de l’Habitat (CRH), a bank created by the 
French state in 1985 to issue bonds for refinancing residential mortgage home loans, took 
over the operation’s outstanding-debt management. The CRH was appointed to manage the 
SFEF’s debt services and collateral management from January 1, 2010, to December 31, 
2014. Ultimately, none of the loans made by SFEF defaulted and it generated more than €1 
billion n fees. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. SFEF was launched alongside a recapitalization program as part of a two-pronged 
approach to the crisis. 
Following a meeting of Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations on October 10, 2008, 
which focused on guiding principles for action during the financial crisis, the French 
government pursued a dual approach to aid their banking system that included the SFEF and 
Société de Prise de Participation de l’Etat (SPPE). The French government created the SPPE 
in October 2008 as a limited liability company to perform recapitalizations. Its first injection 
was €1 billion toward the international bailout of Dexia SA, a troubled Belgium-based bank 
with operations across Europe, in return for a 5.7% stake in the company. In December 2008, 
SPPE began a broad recapitalization scheme for French banks to ensure they continued 
lending to the economy. 
2. Legal Authority came from the “loi de finances rectificative pour le financement de 
I'économie, adopted on October 17, 2008 
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The “loi de finances rectificative pour le financement de I’économie” was passed on October 
13, 2008, and adopted on October 17, four days later. SFEF itself had actually existed as a 
company called Doumer Hyperion since 2003, but was given new guidelines for its future 
operations. The use of Doumer Hyperion was a convenience intended to avoid the delay 
involved in establishing a new entity.   
3. European Commission approval was required for the SFEF. 
On October 28, 2008, French authorities notified the European Commission (EC) of the SFEF. 
On October 30, 2008 the EC determined that the SFEF was compatible with State aid 
requirements. The EC also approved a six-month extension of the program in May 2009. As 
discussed in more detail below, the need to structure the SFEF in such a way as to ensure EC 
approval significantly influenced the design of certain program features. 
4. Up to €265 billion of debt issued by the SFEF could be guaranteed. 
Documents establishing the SFEF did not disclose the specific motivation for this figure. 
5. The SFEF issued guaranteed debt, using the proceeds to provide loans to credit 
institutions in France (including subsidiaries of foreign banks) that met capital 
requirements established by French law. 
The creation of the SFEF was a unique aspect of the French rescue plan. Most European states 
decided to directly guarantee the issuances of their major banks. France chose to consolidate 
issuances and refinancing responsibility with the SFEF, creating a much more indirect form 
of intervention. Through the SFEF, French authorities were able to exercise control of the 
allocation of credit to eligible institutions, based on a formula tied to the size of an 
institution’s balance sheet in France and the amount of French loans it had outstanding. 
Moreover, with a single entity issuing bonds on the market, France was also able to avoid 
coordination problems when timing issuances (de Kergommeaux et al. 2008). If many banks 
are attempting to raise funds, their interactions on the market may result in less total funds 
being raised. Last, because investors would be buying guaranteed debt issued by an SPV 
making collateralized loans to a range of institutions rather than guaranteed debt issued by 
a single such institution, SFEF may have enabled banks to access funds at a lower rate than 
they would have through a direct guarantee (Cavalier 2010). 
The SFEF had initial capital of €50 million and was jointly owned by a group of seven banks 
representing 80% of the balance sheet total of the French banking industry. The banks held 
a 66% ownership stake and the French state 34%. This ownership structure was driven by 
French authorities’ desire to exclude SFEF liabilities from the state’s public debt. A decision 
by Eurostat, the body responsible for harmonizing economic statistics across the EU, during 
the crisis held that the guaranteed liabilities of special purpose entities established on a 
temporary basis to address the crisis could be excluded from public debt if they were 
majority privately owned.   
Despite this private ownership, the French state bore the risk of the guarantee, and thus had 
significant control over the SFEF, which was governed by a board of directors composed of 
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10 members. The board included two representatives of the state, one of which acted as 
chairman of the board. The members of the board could execute duties only with the 
permission of the Minister of the Economy, bringing their actions under direct scrutiny of 
the government. Furthermore, board meetings were attended by a state commissioner with 
full veto power on decisions that could influence the French state’s interests in relation to its 
guarantee. These meetings were also attended by the governor of the Banque de France who 
was responsible for the smooth conduct of the SFEF’s affairs. On top of this, the SFEF, while 
not a credit institution, was supervised by the French Banking Commission. Thus, in spite of 
being a separate vehicle, the SFEF was tightly supervised by the state and its actions closely 
monitored (de Kergommeaux et al. 2008). 
The bank shareholders of the SFEF could only earn a profit on their invested capital 
equivalent to the rate of return on a government bond. This was consistent with the 
shareholders’ being compensated for having their capital tied up rather than fully put at risk. 
6. The SFEF only granted financing collateralized by eligible receivables and set 
conditions to benefit from over-collateralization 
This was intended to limit the exposure of the SFEF. Eligible collateral included: 
i) First-rate mortgages and real estate loans of equivalent security  
ii) Loans made for the financing of a real estate asset in France (in the form of a lease 
or guaranteed by some credit institution) 
iii) Loans to highly rated corporations 
iv) Loans to particular public entities 
v) Credit export loans confirmed by particular credit export agencies 
Collateral was subject to haircuts ranging from 10% to 40%, depending on the category 
of pledged assets. 
According to the legislation establishing SFEF, beneficiary credit institutions owed the 
SFEF a claim for an amount equal to principal, interest, and ancillary rights of the loan 
granted by SFEF to such credit institution; in case of default, a direct right over any sums 
paid with respect to the underlying receivables together with the enforcement proceeds 
of any security rights attached to such receivables. Loans made by the SFEF were, thus, 
highly secure and the SFEF’s exposure very limited (de Kergommeaux 2008). 
7. The maximum maturity for debt issued by the SFEF and for the loans that it then 
made with the proceeds was five years. 
No more than 30% of guaranteed debt could have a maturity of greater than three years. 
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The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity requirements for 
debt issued by the SFEF or the loans it made with the proceeds. 
8. All currencies appear to be eligible. 
Program documents do not appear to contain any restrictions on the currencies eligible to 
be used under the SFEF. 
9. Institutions were capped on refinancing by the greater of 5% of their balance sheet 
total or €500 million. 
In allocating loans among eligible institutions, French used a formula tied to the size of an 
institution’s balance sheet in France and the amount of French loans it had outstanding. 
10.  SFEF made loans at an interest rate that included a guarantee fee based on the 
maturity of the loan and the risk profile of the borrower. 
The interest rate charged on loans from the SFEF was intended to cover SFEF’s financing 
costs plus an additional fee for the state guarantee. French authorities followed October 
2008 guidance from the European Central Bank (ECB) in developing their approach to the 
guarantee fee. For loans of greater than one year, the guarantee fee was equal to the bank’s 
median value 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spread over the period from January 1, 2007, 
to August 31, 2008, plus an add-on fee. Banks without CDS spreads would use representative 
CDS spreads based on their credit ratings. For loans of one year or less, only the add-on fee 
would be charged.   
Under the ECB’s guidance, the add-on fee was set at 50 basis points (bps).  However, given 
the collateralized nature of the loans made by SFEF, the European Commission approved a 
lower add-on fee of 20 bps. 
These fees were required to be paid up front. 
11. Beneficiary credit institutions were required to enter into an agreement with the 
French state that set out a number of ethical and economic commitments, 
particularly with regard to lending to the real economy.  
Guidance issued by the European Commission in October 2008 on the creation of credit 
guarantee programs called for the inclusion in such programs of a set of safeguards to 
minimize distortions and avoid moral hazard. This guidance did not specify exactly what 
safeguards a program should include, but required “an adequate combination” of elements, 
including restrictions on advertising based on the guarantee, balance sheet growth, share 
buybacks, and executive compensation, some of which France adopted. 
The specific commitments required of the institutions accessing funding from the SFEF 
included providing credit to individuals, households, small and medium-size companies, and 
local authorities. In particular, institutions had to maintain annual growth in loans to the 
French economy of 3% to 4% until December 31, 2009. Participating institutions had to 
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submit monthly reports on loan volumes and could be excluded from the program for failure 
to meet targets. In addition, they agreed to seek ad hoc solutions for customers experiencing 
payment difficulties.  
Banks also had to commit to following certain rules on executive compensation, severance 
arrangements, balance sheet growth, and advertising.  
12. Beneficiaries were required to show possession of owed funds several days before 
payments were due.  
Credit institutions were required to deposit funds owed to the SFEF in special accounts at 
the Banque de France pledged to the SFEF several days before payments were actually due. 
This requirement ensured that beneficiary credit institutions were prepared to repay 
borrowed funds on time or else provide the SFEF with advanced warning of inability to pay. 
If an institution was unable to deposit owed funds ahead of time, the SFEF would notify the 
government of an inability to pay. This would give the SFEF time to acquire funds from the 
state guarantee, and then repay its own debt holders on time. Through this strategy, the SFEF 
ensured its debt holders were repaid in a timely manner and thus maintained a positive 
reputation for the SFEF as a solid investment opportunity.    
13. The guarantee was applied only to bonds issued before December 31, 2009. 
The plan was intended to be only a temporary measure. The SFEF was to issue bonds only 
until the end of 2009. Like many other design decisions, this measure may have been 
intended to ensure the banks were not excessively dependent on state assistance. The goal 
was to provide some aid to the institutions until market conditions improved. Also like many 
design decisions, this provision may have been possible only due to the subdued nature of 
the crisis in France.  
III. Evaluation 
The French state’s intervention in the financial crisis is generally considered relatively 
successful. Their actions resulted in substantial drops in the credit risk of French banks and 
an increase in their debt valuation. The gross impact on bank equity was an increase of 2% 
to 7% (Xiao 2009). These estimates, however, describe the impact of the full range of the 
French state’s interventions, not just the SFEF’s operations.  
The SFEF is generally considered a successful intervention. It managed to raise €77 billion 
by the end of its operations and establish a reputation as a fruitful investment opportunity. 
The organization received funds from about 900 different sources during the relatively short 
span of its operations. The state guarantee played a notable role in the SFEF’s success, 
assuring investors that it was a very secure investment (GlobalCapital 2009).  
The impact of SFEF funding was broad, providing loans for 13 major credit institutions by 
May 2009. These institutions represented 83.5% of total loans to the economy at the time, 
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and so were very influential in the financial markets. Additionally, the financing appears to 
have served its purpose well. In early 2009, total loans from beneficiary banks of the SFEF 
had grown by 7.2% from 2008, well exceeding the target of 3% to 4%. Thus, the actions of 
the SFEF were indeed benefiting the banks and effectively contributing to the continued 
financing of the French real economy (European Commission 2009). The plan effectively 
mitigated the liquidity problem it was designed to address and achieved its goals of aiding 
the French economy.  
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V. Key Program Documents 
Academic Papers 
A Modern and Secure Solution (de Kergommeaux 2009) – Article analyzing the French 
response to the global financial crisis.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/iflr.pdf. 
Financial systems in financial crisis—An analysis of banking systems in the EU (Detzer et al. 
2014) – Article analyzing the disparate banking systems in the European Union.   
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/financial-systems-in-
financial-crisis-an-analysis-of-banking-systems-in-the-eu.pdf.  
Mastering the Financial Crisis—The French Approach Discussion Report (Conac 2010) -  
Article focusing on the French response to the global financial crisis. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/European%20Company%20an
d%20Financial%20Law%20Review.pdf. 
French Banks Amid the Global Financial Crisis (Xiao 2009) – IMF working paper analyzing 
how French banks responded to the global financial crisis 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/_wp09201.pdf.  
On French Interventions in the Financial Crisis (Cavalier 2010) – Article discussing the French 
responses to the global financial crisis. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/On%20French%20Interven
tions%20in%20the%20Financial%20Crisis.pdf. 
Analysis of the Current Financial Crisis (Vallageas 2009) – Article discussing the global 
financial crisis in France and the interaction with the European Central Bank. 
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Vallageas.pdf. 
French Capitalism under Stress: How Nicolas Sarkozy Rescued the Banks (Jabko and Massoc 
2012) – Article discussing the governmental response to the global financial crisis in France.   
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Sarkozy.pdf. 
France: 2009 Article IV Consultation: Staff Report; Public Information Notice on the 
Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for France 
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Appendix A: SFEF Activity 
SFEF Activity 




Maturation Date Coupon Rate Spread Number of 
Loans 
Advanced 
Nov. 12, 20084 €5 billion  Nov. 24, 2011 3.5% 5 bps over mid-swap 
rate 
9 loans 
Dec. 1, 2008 €6 billion  Dec. 10, 2010 3% 4 bps over mid-swap 
rate 
10 loans 
Dec. 9, 2008  
(private 
placement) 
€2 billion  March 18, 2010 EURIBOR 
minus 5 bps 
N/S 9 loans 
Jan. 7, 2009 €5 billion Jan. 16, 2014 3.25% 15 bps over mid-
swap rate 
11 loans 
Jan. 23, 2009 $6 billion Jan. 30, 2012 2.125% 40 bps over the mid-
swap rate 
9 loans 
Feb. 3, 2009 €6 billion Feb. 10, 2011 2.25% 9 bps over the mid-
swap rate 
11 loans 
Feb. 18, 2009 $5.5 billion Feb. 25, 2011 2% 45 bps over mid-
swap rate 
N/A5 
March 3, 2009 €6 billion March 10, 2012 2.373% 15 bps over mid-
swap rate 
N/A 
March 16, 2009 $4 billion March 26, 2012 2.375% 50 bps over mid-
swap rate 
N/A 




4 This first loan was intended as a test to make sure the SFEF infrastructure worked. 
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April 15, 2009 $3 billion  Oct. 29, 2010 1.5% 30 bps over 
interpolated one- 
year, two-year USD 
mid-swap rate 
N/A 
April 22, 2009 $7 billion  May 5, 2014 3.375% 37 bps over mid-
swap rate 
N/A 
May 11, 2009 €5 billion May 20, 2013 2.125% 10 bps over mid-
swap rate 
N/A 
June 2, 2009 $6 billion  June 11, 2012 2.25% 25 bps over mid-
swap rate 
N/A 
June 22, 2009 €5 billion June 30, 2014 3.125% 25 bps over mid-
swap rate 
N/A 




July 8, 2009 €3 billion July 16, 2012 Floating 3-
month CHF 
LIBOR plus 5 
bps 
N/A N/A 
July 8, 2009 £750 million  July 16, 2012 Floating 3-
month CHF 
LIBOR plus 5 
bps 
N/A N/A 
July 8, 2009 $3 billion  July 16, 2012 Floating 3-
month USD 
LIBOR plus 20 
bps 
N/A N/A 
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